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## **DSRM Risk — Analytical Capability Statement**

Pattern Recognition · Offender Intelligence · Operational Environment Analysis

*Seoul / Tokyo · May 2026 · Restricted Distribution*

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### **What this document is**

This is not a service brochure. It is a record of analytical work conducted across three continents over six years — work that identified patterns institutions missed, produced profiles that subsequent events confirmed, and applied a consistent methodology to environments that conventional security frameworks were not designed to read.

It is offered to organisations that have begun to ask whether their existing security and risk intelligence capability is seeing everything it needs to see.

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## The founding question

In 2019, a staff safety commission from a major financial institution considering a move to Korea. As part of the external stressors framework I have developed, I conduct broad environmental research that surfaces conditions not always within the specific scope of a client request. The analysis of missing women aged 18 to 30 was not specifically requested. It was included because the framework is designed to identify what isn't being asked for.

Over the nine years prior to the study period, the annual number of missing women aged 18 to 30 across South Korea averaged 40.4 cases — 13, 28, 23, 37, 45, 42, 42, 67, 67. In the three years covered by the research — 2016, 2017, and 2018 — the figures were 118, 195, and 294 respectively: a yearly average of 202.3. By 2018, the annual figure was more than seven times the prior baseline. This was not a rise. It was an acceleration of a different order entirely.

**In the relatively contained city of Gyeongsan** — population 261,924 — six women in the 18 to 30 age group disappeared between 2016 and 2018. Five disappeared on a Wednesday. The sixth on a Tuesday. A subsequent look outside the study window found a further case in Gyeongsan in 2014 — also a Tuesday. The pattern predated the research. It had simply never been examined.

The pattern was invisible to the authorities not because the data did not exist, but because the system lacked curiosity.

This is linkage blindness in its purest form — the structural failure to examine cases as potentially related rather than treating each as an isolated matter. The pattern was identified. The relevant authorities were approached privately and in good faith. The conversation was closed down. The missing persons system was subsequently updated to include day of the week as a required field.

The pattern had been confirmed. The conversation had not happened.

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## What the Korea research established

The Wednesday clustering in Gyeongsan was one of several patterns identified within the dataset. Each one demonstrated the same analytical principle: structure exists in data that institutional collection methods are not designed to surface. The gap is not in the data. It is in the questions being asked of it.

**A second pattern emerged in Jeonju.** Three women disappeared along the same 6km road stretch — on 11th October 2016, 11th October 2017, and 11th November 2018. Their last known locations were studio apartments housing entry-level single workers. The date recurrence, the geography, and the victim profile created a pattern that no single case file would reveal. The cases were never formally linked.

**A third pattern emerged within 5km of the Hwaseong serial killer sites.** Three disappearances occurred within 900 metres of each other, in a triangular formation: Friday 25th August 2017, sixth floor. Friday 13th October 2017, fifteenth floor. Saturday 28th October 2017, twenty-second floor. The ascending floor sequence — sixth, fifteenth, twenty-second — carries analytical significance that has not been publicly examined. The geographic proximity to one of South Korea's most studied



criminal sites makes the absence of formal linkage analysis a meaningful institutional observation in itself.

These three patterns share a common structure: the data was present. The questions that would have surfaced them were not being asked.

*The issue is not teaching people what to think. It is teaching them how to think.*

Six years later that distinction remains the foundation of every piece of work produced under the DSRM analytical framework.

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## **The violence against women context**

The Korea research did not emerge in isolation. It sits within a global trend that institutional responses have consistently failed to reverse.

In England and Wales, recorded crimes involving violence against women rose by almost 40% between 2018–19 and 2022–23 — from approximately 790,000 incidents to over 1,080,000. The National Police Chiefs' Council described the situation as a national emergency. Almost 3,000 crimes of violence against women are recorded by police every day.

The murder of Sarah Everard in London in 2021 — by a serving Metropolitan Police officer — generated the most significant public institutional response to violence against women in recent UK history. Awareness increased substantially. The data did not improve meaningfully. Awareness is not the same as engagement.

In South Korea, 80% of violent crime victims are women. A survey conducted during the assessment period found that 57.8% of women reported feeling vulnerable to misogynistic violence. Digital sex crimes — hidden camera offences, non-consensual image distribution — rose consistently throughout the period, becoming a defining feature of the Korean MeToo movement in 2018.

The MeToo period itself introduced an analytical paradox that the Korea research had begun to identify: increased reporting confidence, while essential, may in some cases correlate with escalation in the severity of violence — as perpetrators respond to perceived disruption of established patterns of control. That hypothesis has not been conclusively proven. It has not been conclusively disproven. It remains an active analytical question that institutional frameworks are not currently positioned to ask.

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## The offender profile — and what it confirmed

Around the same period as the Korea research, I undertook a commissioned engagement with a senior US Military command in Korea to address a crisis of institutional sexual violence that had become severe enough to generate its own chain of command reaching to General officer level.

The analytical response produced a structured offender profile focused on the power rapist typology within hierarchical institutional environments — specifically examining how certain organisational cultures may unintentionally provide ideal operating conditions for dominance-oriented predatory personalities.

The profile identified a specific structural gap: institutions with highly developed mechanisms for identifying and promoting high performers — the best of the best — had no equivalent mechanism for identifying predatory personalities who had learned to perform those markers as cover. The promotion culture and the predatory culture were operating in the same space. Only one of them was being systematically examined.

The institutional response to the debrief was delivered by a two-star General: profiling of this nature could not be implemented as policy. The impression conveyed was that the barrier was political rather than analytical.

The profile was produced. The conversation was closed. The subsequent public record did what it invariably does when institutions decline to act on analytical findings.

**Wayne Couzens** — a firearms-trained Metropolitan Police officer serving in the Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection Command — kidnapped, raped and murdered Sarah Everard in March 2021. He was convicted in September of that year and received a whole life order. The behavioural markers were not invisible: Couzens had an unaddressed history of indecent exposure prior to and during his police career, and was known among colleagues by a nickname that named his pathology directly — years before the murder. The institution heard it. It did not act on it.

**David Carrick** served in the same unit.

In January 2023, David Carrick pleaded guilty to 49 offences including 24 rapes committed over nearly two decades. Like Couzens, he was firearms-trained, serving in the same elite command, with prior complaints of domestic violence and harassment that were repeatedly missed or dismissed. He was known to colleagues as ‘Bastard Dave’ because of his cruelty toward women. The behavioural profile, the institutional dynamics, the enabling conditions, the protection mechanisms, the victim silencing — every element of the framework I produced for the US Military mapped onto both cases with precision.

**The profile had crossed an institutional boundary — from US Military to British policing** — *without modification*. Because the enabling conditions are not institution-specific. They are structural. They recur wherever strong hierarchy, ingroup loyalty, weapons culture, public legitimacy, and inadequate accountability mechanisms combine to create space for dominance-oriented predators to operate. Two officers. The same unit. The same profile. Neither case had come to light when the profile was written.

## The structural argument

The cases referenced in this document — the Korean missing women, the US Military engagement, the Couzens and Carrick convictions — are not connected by geography, by institution, or by the specific nature of the offending. They are connected by a single analytical observation:

The cost of not asking arrives later, at greater scale, with less control over the outcome.

The organisations most exposed to this dynamic are not the ones that have experienced a public scandal. They are the ones that have not yet — and have concluded from the absence of a visible crisis that no analytical gap exists.

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## The operational application — Mission Bay, San Francisco

In 2026, the analytical methodology was applied to the operational environment surrounding a specific urban site — 1455 3rd Street, Mission Bay, San Francisco — producing a structured environmental exposure review examining how the external environment intersects with the workforce moving through it.

The review identified ten exposure pathways, distinguished between two fundamentally different threat actor types operating in the same environment, and introduced a public health dataset as a leading indicator of behavioural instability before it surfaces in conventional crime statistics.

The same principle that identified the Wednesday pattern in Gyeongsan, and the structural enabling conditions in the US Military profile, produced the Mission Bay framework: structure exists in the environment that standard organisational reporting is not designed to surface. The gap is not in the data. It is in the questions being asked of it.

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## The ongoing intelligence product

The analytical programme is not periodic. It is continuous.

A monthly Operational Intelligence Briefing tracks evolving environmental conditions across the urban corridors surrounding designated operational sites — incorporating recorded crime data, naloxone deployment trends, violence against women indicators, and behavioural pattern analysis across relevant transit and movement environments.

Its value lies not in the raw data it monitors. It lies in knowing what to look for, how to interpret shifting patterns, and how to connect what the surrounding environment presents to what the organisation needs from the people moving through it. That interpretive capability sits outside the conventional scope of most internal security, HR, or facilities functions.

Consistency of monitoring, and consistency of interpretation, is what converts publicly available data into actionable organisational intelligence.

## The global dimension

The methodology does not depend on a single geography. It was developed through research in South Korea, applied in a US Military context, validated against UK policing cases, and operationalised in a San Francisco urban environment.

**Locations once considered stable reference points for safe operational environments are undergoing measurable change. Japan — historically among the lowest crime-rate environments in the world — is recording a significant and accelerating stimulant dependency problem in its major urban centres. South Korea is experiencing a comparable emergence.**

Organisations with operational facilities in Tokyo, Osaka, Seoul, or any major urban centre that has historically felt safe are carrying an exposure they may not yet have a framework to see.

The analytical approach described in this document applies wherever critical workers move through urban environments to reach the facilities organisations depend on — and wherever the institutional frameworks meant to protect them remain oriented toward what to think rather than how to think.

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## What this programme offers

Not a security audit. Not a compliance review. Not a generic threat assessment.

A structured analytical capability that has demonstrated, across multiple jurisdictions and institutional contexts, the ability to identify what standard frameworks miss — before the cost of not having seen it arrives.

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## DSRM Risk

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Enquiries regarding this programme and its application to specific operational environments are welcomed.

*May 2026*

