Afghanistan, Heroin, and the Drug Trade with US Government Support
Afghanistan is indisputably the largest producer of opium poppies (Papaver somniferum) in the world, which provide the gum from which heroin is derived. To better understand how such a dysfunctional country has been able to supply most of the world’s heroin, it is essential to examine not only Afghanistan’s recent history but also how Western colonial powers have historically operated. Since the Renaissance, all empires, including the British, French, and Dutch, have utilised drugs to fund their global expansions.
In more modern times, the overseas expansionism of the United States appears to have been closely related to securing energy resources, often relying on regional narcotics agents to fund their projects. Since the end of military operations in Korea, the United States has been involved in several major overseas conflicts in developing nations: Vietnam (1961–1975), the Persian Gulf (1990–1991), Colombia (1991–present), and Afghanistan (2001–2021). Each war was fought in or near significant oil-producing regions, and in each case, the US depended upon the cooperation of international drug traffickers. This pattern of supporting drug-trafficking partners is arguably a major contributing factor to the rise in global drug use since 1945. These drug proxies have been employed either to support US military operations or as their surrogates.
Ironically, by supporting the drug trade, the United States has inadvertently contributed to money laundering, people smuggling, and, of course, the drug trade itself, which in turn funds global terrorism. The US, its interests, and its allies are frequent targets of this terrorism. These risks, it seems, were deemed acceptable to secure energy and oil reserves.
Kosovo: A Prelude to Strategic Drug Politics
Consider the Kosovo conflict (1998–1999), which was ostensibly initiated due to Yugoslavia’s attacks on ethnic Albanians, who retaliated under the banner of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In 1998, the US intervened, and by the following year, NATO launched a bombing campaign that forced Yugoslav forces to withdraw from Kosovo.
However, in 1998, the US State Department had branded the KLA an international terrorist organisation, alleging it was financed by the global heroin trade and supported by loans from known terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. Similar assertions were made by the British media at the time.
Curiously, the American intervention followed discussions about the region becoming a route for a Western pipeline to carry oil from the Caspian Sea. In November 1998, then-US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said of Caspian oil extraction and transportation: “This is about America’s energy security … We've made a substantial political investment in the Caspian, and it's very important to us that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right.”
While the suggestion that support for the KLA was linked to the pipeline was dismissed at the time, the Trans-Balkan Pipeline is now a reality. Although it does not pass through Kosovo, it traverses Albania to the port of Vlore on the Adriatic Sea. For this pipeline to materialise, Albanian leaders reportedly demanded at a December 1998 project meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, that the situation in Kosovo be resolved. Three months later, NATO attacked Yugoslavia.
Afghanistan: A Heroin Epicentre
In 1979, the United States began supplying weapons to Mujahideen fighters opposing the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan government. One prominent Mujahideen leader was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a known drug trafficker with his own heroin refineries.
Before 1979, the heroin reaching the United States came primarily from Turkey, with negligible amounts from Afghanistan. By 1980, however, Afghanistan was supplying 60% of US heroin. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year heightened Washington’s fears of Russian influence over Middle Eastern oil fields, compounded by the recent Iranian Revolution. Russia’s presence in Afghanistan brought it within 500 kilometres of the Arabian Sea and its oil reserves—the lifeblood of the US economy.
In response, the US bolstered its presence in the Gulf to fill the power vacuum left by the Shah’s fall and Britain’s 1971 withdrawal from the region. US interference in Afghanistan aimed to lure Russia into an unwinnable conflict, effectively giving them their own Vietnam. This objective was deemed far more critical than controlling the drug trade.
Following the Soviet invasion, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan steadily increased. By the mid-1980s, production rose from 140 metric tonnes to 400 tonnes, doubling again by 1987. Impoverished farmers, whose land had been destroyed by Soviet forces, were lured by opium’s lucrative value—$50 per half-kilo at the time. Mujahideen fighters, supported by the US, were hired to protect crops and transport. By the mid-1980s, this trade created an $8 billion black economy. Simultaneously, heroin addiction in Pakistan soared from zero in 1979 to approximately 1.7 million by 1988. Today, it stands at around seven million.
The Role of Pakistan and the ISI
The Afghanistan-Pakistan heroin trade flourished with the tacit support of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, which was heavily funded by the US. Concerns over Pakistan’s involvement in the heroin trade grew among European law enforcement agencies, as 70% of the world’s heroin was routed through Pakistan. In 1986, two Pakistani military officers were arrested with 220 kilograms of high-grade heroin. They were swiftly removed from custody by military units and subsequently “escaped” without investigation. Despite US awareness of these activities, defeating the Russians in Afghanistan remained the priority.
The Taliban and the Heroin Trade
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, US funding ceased, leading to a civil war among the Mujahideen factions. The opium trade became the primary source of revenue, with factions taxing producers and transporters. From this chaos, the Taliban emerged in 1994, initially gaining support by offering protection from Mujahideen violence.
Though the Taliban claimed to oppose the heroin trade, they eventually relied on it to finance their regime. Taxes on production and transport reportedly generated $1.25 billion annually. To gain international recognition and alleviate sanctions, Taliban leader Mullah Omar banned poppy cultivation in 2000. However, the ban coincided with Taliban leaders stockpiling opium and later profiting from skyrocketing prices.
By 2001, only 8,000 hectares were planted with opium poppies, compared to 82,000 hectares the previous year. The ban impoverished farmers but boosted the Taliban’s revenues. Following the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, poppy cultivation resumed. By 2002, 74,000 hectares were planted, and heroin labs proliferated, particularly along the Pakistan and Iranian borders.
Western Occupation and the Drug Trade
Throughout the Western occupation, heroin production surged. By 2020, land allocated to poppy cultivation had increased by 37%, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The heroin trade became integral to Afghanistan’s economy, underscoring that there has been no true “war on drugs”—only wars funded by drugs.
As Western forces withdrew, the heroin trade expanded. The Taliban’s reliance on the trade suggests it will remain central to their survival. Meanwhile, Western nations have failed to address the root issue of demand. Liberal drug policies in Europe and the US have fuelled consumption, further incentivising production.
Implications for Korea
South Korea’s strict anti-drug policies have successfully deterred widespread heroin use, but demand for other drugs, including methamphetamine and fentanyl, is rising. As prescription opioid abuse is curbed, alternative sources may emerge.
The recent arrival of nearly 400 Afghan refugees in Korea poses additional challenges. While many refugees reportedly assisted Korean forces in Afghanistan, concerns remain over potential criminal activities, including drug trafficking. The Hawala system, commonly used in the Middle East, could facilitate illicit financial transactions.
Organisations like KAADA must internationalise their operations and develop risk assessments to address these evolving threats. Without a comprehensive understanding of global drug trafficking networks, Korea risks being unprepared for the challenges ahead.
Anthony Hegarty MSc
September 2020
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